Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1972

Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce
William Joseph Zanardi
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Zanardi, William Joseph, "Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce" (1972). Master's Theses.
2612.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2612

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1972 William Joseph Zanardi

IDEA AND ABSOLUTE IN ntE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE

by

William J. Zanardi

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
May

1972

IDEA AND ABSOLUTE IN nm
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE
Attempts to controvert an author's interpretation of his own work have
been frequent and often successful.

The critic may prove to be a hetter judge

of an author's meaning and thereby exemplify Schliermacher's paradox, namely,
that the skilled interpreter understands an author better than the latter understands himself.

But this thesis asserts that one attempt to reverse an author's

explicit understanding of his own work has not been successful. Specifically,
the interpretation of Peter Puss 1 in regard to the later work of Josiah Royce
is not an instance of Schliermacher's paradox.

Rather Royce's understanding

of the unb1t<>ken continuity of his own absolute idealism is to be preferred to
any denial of absolutistic aspects in his later works.
The thesis will be divided into six sections.

The first offers a brief

restatement of Puss' hypothesis that Royce abandoned his absolutism late in his
philosophical career.

Next to be considered is the correspondence of Royce,

particularly those letters affirming the continuity in his philosophy.

The third

section begins the research into Royce's Absolute by means of his view of what
an idea is.

In addition to Royce's explicit statements asserting the consistency

of his thought, this thesis offers an argument for such consistency based on the
function of the idea in Royce's epistemology.

The varied uses of an idea are

detailed in thrae major works spanning Royce's professional life.

Thus the

third, fourth, and fifth sections analyze the idea in The Religious Aspect
lpeter Puss, The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce (Cambridge:
University Press, 1965).

Harvard

o~

2

~]1_i_los!l~X.• 2 The World and the Individual, 3 and The Problem of Christianitr4
respectively.

The final section summarizes the preceding arguments and concludes

that Royce did not abandon his absolutism with the writing of The Problem of

C.!1 r~-~-~-~!!,!.!'.Y~.
A cautionary note should be added.

This thesis has a modest aim, namely,

to prove that Royce means what he says when he insists that his philosophy of
interpretation is consistent with his earlier, more traditional form of absolute
idealism.

There is no attempt to provide a detailed exposition of Royce's

metaphysics.

Rather the modest aim of the thesis is pursued with the emphasis

placed on epistemological arguments.

As a result, this is not an introduction

to nor a defense of the philosophy of Josiah Royce.

Only insofar as the thesis

justifies Royce's understanding of his own work is it a defense of his philosophy
as an honest and integral achievement.

2Josiah Royce, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958).
3,Josiah Royce, (i! vols. ; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959).
4Josiah Royce, (n.p.: Archon Books, 1967).
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I

A work entitled The Moral Philosophy of Josiah
a controversy when it appeared in 1965.

Ro~ce

renewed something of

Its author, Peter Fuss, suggested that,

in replacing his concept of Absolute Mind or Absolute Will with the notion of
a Community of Interpretation,

Roye~

was in effect abandoning the absolutistic

aspects of his philosophical idealism.

The latter notion surfaced in Royce's

public thought a short two years before his death.

Ostensibly it had little

reference to his earlier metaphysics of Absolute Idealism.

Puss' arguments for

a radical break in Royce's thought appear in an appendix to his work. S He offers
them in summary form with the promise of a yet to be published work more carefully detailing his hypothesis.

The summary appears in three sections labelled

"Metaphysics," "Epistemology," and "Doctrine of Man.u
According to Fuss, the year 1913 divides Royce's earlier
from his later doctrine of the Community of Interpretation.
the real is taken to be the object of an Absolute Mind.

and the Individual, the Ahsolute b

views

Prior to that date,

The latter is described

as "passionless eternal thought" in Royce's first major work.
:!:~.i:._2~orld

met~physical

Subsequently, in

defined in more voluntaristic

terms as the "eternal fulfillment of finite purposes."

Both works share the

position that the reality of time is dependent on a finite viewpoint.
to the Absolute, all reality is eternally what it is.

In reference

The existence of such an

Absolute perspective is logically demonstrated through an argument of presupposition by denial.
With the writing of The Problem of Christiani!_y, these philosophical positions are alleged to be radically altered.
object of a Community of Interpretation.

The real is then taken to be the
The latter is described as a "social

organism made up of an unlimited number of finite human beings."

Its existence

is not logically demonstrable, and its origin and activity require a real order

51:'......
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of time.

In Fuss' words, the t.emporal order "is apparently, the only real order. 11

Tilere is thus a need for history and social process.6
The second part of the schematic outline summarizes Royce's epistemological
views.

In his early works, human knowing is comprised of single percepts and

concepts whose real objects are the C'Ontents of an Absolute Mind.

The truth of

a knower's ideas consists in their correspondence to the contents of Absolute

Thought, but this agreement is known only to the latter.

After 1913, human know-

ing is described generally as "social processes of interpretation whose problem-

atic objects are progressively determined by an unlimited Community of human
investigators."

Truth is found in the coherence of a particular interpretation

with the whole of a man's experience.

requiring interpretation.

The latter consists of a "universe of signs''

But this coherence is complete only in the ideal final

interpretation of an infinite Community. 7
Royce's early philosophy of man views finite individuals in relation to an
all-embracing Self.

They are fragments of an Absolute Self and give unique

expression to its Purpose.

A man necessarily is included in the Absolute Self,

and what evil he does is eternally rectified in this necessary inclusion.

But

the later work of Royce emphasizes that the relation of the finite individual to
a Conununity of Interpretation results from a free decision.

There are morally

autonomous members of the Community who together seek the fulfillment of shared
purposes.

The uniqueness of the individual arises out of a "complex process of

social imitation and contrast."

He adopts a unique life plan which may benefit

or harm the Community. but this very indetermina,cy underlines the individual
member's moral freedom. 8
The contrasts made by Fuss are

well-fou.~ded

on Roycean texts.

This thesis,

therefore, does not charge him with a selective use of Royce's words.

·----·------

,-s---

~Ibid., pp. 259-60.

Ibid., pp. 260-61.
Ib id_., pp. 261-62.

Nor. for

5

that matter, <loes it disput,.e his

listin~

of significant

chan~es

after 1913.

Where a difference arises is in Fuss' interpretation of the changes in Royce's
epistemology.

He proposes a radical break between the earlier and later views

of human knowing.

As stated above, this thesis by-passes many of the metaphysical

issues in Royce's philosophy.

It should also be noted that the particular

ethical questions upon which Fuss concentrates are not the main interest here.
What is of concern is the consistency of Royce's use of an Absolute in The Problem
~! Christianit~·::

Though the word "Absolute" occurs hut three times in the latter

work, it is interchanleable with the concept of the "Universal Community of

Interpretation." The validity of such a substitution will be shown by a comparison
of the two terms' epistemological functions in works spanning Royce 1 s philosophical

career.

Tile first

ar~ent

against Fuss' hypothesis and for a consistent

epistemology in Royce lies in the corresrondence of Royce himself.

II

In a footnote to his schematic outline, Fuss lists some of Royce's comments
that reflect both novelty and consistency in his last major work, :iJ:e Problem of
~~-ristianity.

The quotations are taken from the latter volume and hy thomselves

are ambiguous.

They neither wholly stip,.,ort nor entirely deny Fuss' hypothesis.

He condudes that "Royce's own remarks merely add to the riddle. 119

But i.n the

same footnote he quotes in. part a letter from Royce to Mary Wh:i ton Calkins that,
had :l.t been p;iven in its entirety, may have resolved the earlier

Royce's remarks.

My

~uess

ambi.~uity

of

i.s that Fuss di<l not hnve access to the entire letter.

lie wrote prior to the publication of the collected correspondence of Royce 10 and

perhaps only knew of the letter as quoted in part.
Royce's private

correspond~nce,

The availab"i 1i ty of most of

particularJy those letters between 1900 and 1916,

may dispel the riddle accepted by Fuss.

With all of Royce's important letters available to him, John Clendenning
concludes that Royce explicitly maintained the consistency of his philosophy of
interpretation with his earlier doctrine of ahsolute idealism. 11
the importance of the Calkins letter to his conclusion.

He recognizes

The context of the letter

is Royce expressing hi.s appreciati.on of and general agreement with a paper by

Mary Whiton Calkins.

He stresses the

ideas of Community and Spirit.

emer~ence

in his own thought of the two

"They certainly have assumed, :in my own mind, a

new vitality, and a very much deeper significance than, for me, they ever had
before I wrote my Problem of Christia1'.l.!!l... 1112

Royce is quick to add that this

9Ibid., p. 259.
lOJosiah Royce, !he Letters of Josiah Rorce, ed. by John Clendenning (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
11 "At issue is whether the 'Community of Interpretation' in the 1 ater work is
inconsistent with the 'Absolute Thought' of the earlier work; in other words did
Royce finally abandon his absolutism in favor of a merely social idealism? In
his own responses to the question, Royce repeatedly and firmly maintained that
his various constructions were different paths to the same doctrine, that his
latest work revealed additions and reinterpretations, hut not inconsistencies."
Ibid., p. 24.
--i.2Josinh Royce in a letter to Mary Whiton Calkins (March 20, 1916), Ibid., p.645.
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new emphasis on the Community does not reverse anything in his former position.
"The reflections in question constitute, for me, not something inconsistent
with my former position, hut a distinct addition to my former position, a new
attainment,--! believe a new growth."
that you change, in a way

involvin~

He

~oes

on to state, "I do not believe

inconsistency, when you re-interpret former

id eaS , • • •1113 The question of what exactly this reinterpretation consists in
will await the comparison of Royce's three major works.

At this point, note

should be taken of the genetic metaphor used to explain his new idea.

There is

neither a sudden appearance nor a reversal entailed in the notion of the Community
of Interpretation.

As the Calkins letter continues:

Now this view is at present an essential part of my idealism.
In essential meaning I suppose that it always was such an essential
part. But I do not believe that I ever told my tale as fully, or with
the same approach to the far off goal of saying sometime something
that might pryxe helpful to students of idealism, as in the Problem of
Christianity.
The absence of the above parts of the Calkins letter from Fuss' list of
relevant texts is, in my opinion, fatal to one aspect of his argument.

That is,

the ambiguity of Royce's own remarks on the relation of his later and earlier
works cannot stand.

Instead, Royce is explicit in regard to the continuity of

his thought--a new "approach," a reinterpretation does not constitute a radical
departure from absolute idealism.

Another letter gives more details of what

Royce based his view of continuity on.

Subsequent to the writing of The Problem

of Christianity, he wrote to Reginald Chauncey Robbins.
I hardly hope to get together any comprehensive summary and survey of my
philosophical contributions before my little span of working day ends;
but, as a fact, my philosophical contributions, both "pure" and "applied!'
hang pretty closely together ••• --Most of course I prize at present my
latest theory, that of the Peircean "interpretation," with its peculiar
"trials." But in germ I had it (not yet on any Peircean, nor yet on any
Hegelian basis), in my Chapter on "The Possibility of Error" in the
Religious Aspect. Here, in its latest form (as in my book on War and
13Ioid.
141bICf., P· 647.

R

Insurance) is a theory that allows for endless variety of individual
···Tnteipretation," and for endless change, growth and fluency, while
"absoluteness" is nevertheless ''chrono-synoptic" and universal. above
all and in all the flow and the tragedy of this world wnose unity
means that it "contains its own interpreter. 11 15
Again Royce employs a genetic metaphor to describe the relation of his
philosophy of interpreta.tion to his earlier work.

Stress is placed on the unity

of his philosophical enterprise of some thirty years.

Perhaps more important for

this study, Royce affirms that endless interpretation is consistent with a type
of absolutism.

And as will become apparent later, this affirmation of two poles,

the one of finite being and the other, the Absolute Consciousness, is repeated

in the three works to he considered.
Mention can be ma.de of one other letter.

This correspondence was to F .S .C.

Schil lcr, and, coming well after the outbreak of World War I, it expressed Royce's
deepening g;rief over the conflict.

He saw the <lest ruction spread over Europe and

felt helpless to reverse the slaughter.
helplessness that Royce adds:
irthuman form of Absolutism. 1116

It is after comments expressing

such a

"Meanwhile, I do what I can with my not wholly
While too brief a comment to be of much importance

alongside the Calkins and Rohhins letters, it at least indicates Royce continued
to

decl~re

himself an ahsolutist in front of his philosophical opponents.

The editor of Royce's correspondence concludes that the genetic metaphors
used hy Royce to explain his development have some basis in the texts.
we can find the

"~erm"

of the Community.

He suggests

from which "grew" the philosophy of interpretation and idea

What Clendenning proposes is that Royce's attention to the

triadic structure of knowledge in Chapter XI of !Jle
is the first hint of his later philosophy.

Religi~~

Aspect_ of Philosoph}'.:

He already is dissatisfied with know-

ledge as a dyadic relation and demands a third party to contain the truth of what
is known.

Thus Clendenning

su~gests

a rough equivalence between the Universal

l!'Josiah Royce in a letter to Reginald Chauncey Robbins (November 8, 1914),

tbid.i op. 618-19.
··----- 6Josiah Royce in a letter to Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (August 24,
1915), !!>_!E_., p. 635.

Thought of

!_~e

Religious Aspect of Philosophy and the interpreter of the. world

in TI1e Problem of Christianity.

He continues:

The differences are not merely linguistic: in the earlier work,
Royce has no clear ideas of time or of individuality, and hi.s
conception of the triadic structure of knowledge remains too loosely
metaphorical. But he was undoubtedly right in describing his philosophical development as a "growth;" it was mainly a growth toward
clarity.17
This growth toward clarity is evidenced in Royce's letter to Rohbins cited
above.

His acquaintance with Peircean interpretation gave a new form to what he

had long had in mind.

Both the three letters cited and Clendenning's remarks

are sufficient proof that Royce consistently affirmed the continuity between his
major works.

New ideas appeared and genuine development occurred late in his

career, but no radical break was evident to Royce.

Bis private correspondence

does not support, therefore, the "riddle" suggested by Peter Fuss.
not the whole of the latter's hypothesis.

But that is

It is one thing to prove that an

author's understanding of his work is unambiguous; it is another to prove the
validity of that understanding.

The letters considered so far and Clendenning's

remarks have estahlished the former point.
to establish the latter point.

The next three sections will attempt

Clenderming 1 s suggestion of an equivalence between

two of Royce's works is summarily given.
work, The World and the Individual.

He makes no mention of an intervening

What follows then is an account of a specific

development spanning three works of Royce.

Tracing the epistemological function

of an idea through these works will detail more completely the continuity of
Royce's absolutism.

17

Ibi~__., introduction by ClendenninR, pp. 24-25.
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III

In The Religious Aspect of

Phi~o.sophy

representations of real objects.

(1885). ideas are taken to be

As images of what is perceived or thought, a

man's ideas are all that is present to his mind.

These ideas arc the only content

of his thought, and the objects represented remain outside his thought.

To this

extent the position of subjective idealism is correct, i.e. "my mind can be concerned only with its own ideas. 11 18

But a.n immeuiate problem for a subjective

idealist is to account for the difference between truth and error.

If all I

think about will be my ideas, and what they represent are but other ideas of
mlne, then to assert anything about them must be correct.

In that case, sincerity

and truth are identical, for when I assert anything there is no reference to anything outside of my own thought.

As long as I honestly consult my own ideas, I

cannot he in error.19
The truth of my ideas, however, is connnonly taken to be their correspondence
to the objects they represent.

There is a "commonplace assumption" that error is

possible, that an assertion can fail to agree with a real object outside of
thought.

But how is one to judge if this particular assertion is true or false?

To answer that Royce considers what role the judgment plays in human cognition.
It is not an act Jistinct from that of un<lerstanding.

TI1at is, the judgment by

itself has no intelligible object other than the ideas present to all thought.
Royce concludes that the judgment synthesizes my ideas--a position he explicitly
avows to be nee-Kantian.

But if the judgment reaches no object heyond ideas,

the coJmlOn-ser:se belief in error must be either abandoned or supplementec:!.20
18Royce, The Religious Aspect, p. 378.

t9roid.

20i'i'A'"fudgment cannot have an object and fail to agree therewith, unless this
judgment is part of an organism of thought. Alone, as a separate fact, a judgment
has no intelligible object beyond itself. And therefore the presuppositions of
common sense must be supplemented or else abnndoned. Either then there is no error,
or else judgments are true or false only in reference to a higher inclusive thought,
which they presuppose, and which must, in the last analysis, be assumed as Infinite
and all-inclusive." Ibid., p. 393.

11

The former course is impossible, for in choosing it one would be admitting
that common-sense knowledge had been in error.

To state 'error is impossible"

as a remedy for a mistaken assumption is clearly contradictory.

course alone proves viable.

So the latter

Since no single judgment can be an error (for it

reaches no object beyond itself), there must be a higher thought that includes
both the judgment and its real object:.

By comparing the two, this higher thought

determines whether the first thought was true or false.

Left to itself the latter

remains a fragment "neither true nor false, objectless, no complete act of thought
at all. 1121
denial.

This is a very brief sketch of Royce's method of presupposition by

He begins with the fact of error in the world and concludes to an Absolute

Thought.

What follows is a summarized version of Royce's more lengthy argument.

The fact of error is undeniable; to deny this is to contradict oneself. for
how else can this fact be refuted if not by proving it erroneous?

Each error

implies a judgment whose intended object is other than my ideas and so lies beyond
my judgment.
ment.

Such an object will also be an object of a corresponding true judg-

Since the existence of erTOr implies a higher thought, it will be this

thought that contains the object of both the true and false judgments.

Since the

possibilities of error are infinite, the inclusive thought must be infinite.

And

since error is possible not only as regards objects but also as regards relations,
all possible relations in the world must be present to this infinite thought.
Finally, to know all relations at once is to know them in absolute rational \Dlity,
i.e. as one single thought. 22
This line of argumentation presupposes, among other positions, a correspondence
theory of truth and the basic premise of subjective idealism.

Given these positions,

Royce proceeds to analyze human knowing, in particular, human error.

"The conditions

that determine the logical pessibility of error must themselves be absolute
211bid.' p.431.

22-Ibid., pp.424-25.
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~ruth, • . • " 23 Even if one were to find fault with his argument, the et'l"Or
charged to Royce's position is alleged to prove the existence of Absolute Thought.
It alone knows the real and can compare a judgment with its intended object.

Royce offers other arguments for the existence of an Absolute Thought.

The

problem of knowing other minds is an instance employing the already cited view
of hwnan understanding.

My idea of another person can only be true or false if
there is a third party to compare my idea with the real person. 24 There is also

a problem of relating a past idea to a present thought.

in its separate existence and in its view of the future.

'nte past idea was unique
To determine the

identity between its conception of the future and the present thought's conception
of what now has become reality requires an inclusive

thought which compares them.

How else could my past thought have made any assertion about a future moment?
Royce refutes a response that rests on verifying a prediction only upon its fulfillment or failure to occur.

My

memory of an original thought differs from it

and so is still in need of a comparison with that original thought. 25

Again Royce

appeals to a higher thought to make a synthesis of what to the human knower are
disparate ideas.

Both of the above problems--knowledge of other minds and verifi-

cation of future events--will reappear in Royce's later works.

The fact that he

continued to grapple with them indicates his dissatisfaction with the theory of
idealism as it stands in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.
It is important to note that Royce characterizes his higher thought by means
2 3Ibid., P. 385.
24 Thld., pp. 409-10.

25 11 1 postulate also that an error in prediction can be discovered when the
time comes by the failure of the prediction to verify itself. I postulate then
that I can look back and say: TI1us and thus I predicted about this moment,
and thus and thus it has come to pass, and this event contradicts that expectation. But can I in fact ever accomplish this comparison at all? And is the
comparison very easily intelligible? For when the event comes to pass, the
expectation no longer exists. The two thoughts, namely, expectation and actual
experience, are separate thoughts, far apart in time. How can I bring them together
to compare them, so as to see if they have the same object? It will not do to appeal
to memory :for the purpose; for the same question would recur about the memory in
h:s relation to the original thought." Ibid., pp. 418-19.
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of an analysis of human thought.
unity of the former thought.

f-le makes use of analo,,y to characterize the

"As my thought at any time, and however en,aged,

combines several fragmentary thoughts into the unity of one conscious mment, so,
we affirm, does the Universal Thought combine the thoughts of a.11 of us into an
absolute unity of thought, together with all the objects and all the thoughts about
tr.ese objects that are, or have been, or ever wil 1 be, or can be, in the Uni verse. n26
TI1e discontinuity

of this comparison
is immediately twofold.

The Absolute alone

knows the real objects of thought, and the unity of its thoughts is eternally
whole.

There is also a third aspect of discontinuity, for the Absolute is identified

with God.

This involves speaking of a consciousness that inunediately knows all

of reality.

Such a complete knowledge is beyond the ability of any finite individual.

Its existence is known only as the necessary condition for the existence of any
truth whatever.

'Mlese levels of discontinuity between human thought and the final

truth of the whole will reappear in the following works of Royce.

A decisive

question will be whether the ideal final interpretation of the Universal Conununity
is continuous with either the knowledge of an individual or the mind of any
community.
Some conclusions can be drawn from what has been said already about human
ideas.

Royce's absolute idealism produces no .! priori account of what ideas a

man will have.

It does claim to be the one rational explanation of the truth and
falsity of ideas. 27 'nle fragmentary and imperfect thoughts of men are contained

within the Absolute, and it would seem that progress in knowledge (e.g. the
accumulation of new techniques, the development of new sciences) is only
appearance.

Royce indicates that viewed abstractly, in his separateness from

God, a man does make progress in understanding.

Tile individual's rationality is

a temporal fact that seeks full expression in time and in the individual.
26tbid., pp. 475-76.
27fl:T"-

!_o.i..?<_.,

p. 380.

But
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in God there is no striving, no progress.

Human ideas, therefore, are the forms

t

assumed by Infinite Thought, and despite all the many conflicts of ideas. a
final reconciliation of them is eternally present. 28

As a result, any teleology

of human thought will be abstract, i.e. the incompleteness of our ideas depends
on a finite perspective.

The problems this conclusion raises in both ethics and

science are only briefly treated in The Religious Aspect

~f

was to devote more attention to them in his next major work.

Philosophl·

Royce

In it there was to

be a new emphasis on the teleology of ideas and on the limitations of a representational theory of ideas.
Nine years after publishing his first work, Royce offered an appraisal of
it.

His remarks are important in that they come prior to the appearance of his

next major work, !he World and the Individual.

He notes in a letter to George

Holmes Howison that some changes are needed in the book.

But the alterations are

said to be in ''secondary" matters.
The kernel of the book would remain unchanged as to its essence.
But it is above all the method of the book that I should never

repeat--a method that has led and will lead to many unnecessary
misunderstandings. The metaphysical theory, and the critical argume~t, ~~Chap. XI, still remain to me the real insight of the whole
thing.
Ry "method" Royce does not niean his use of presupposition by denial, for that

technique will recur in his later works.

Instead, I think, he is referring to the

presentation of his ethical philosophy which occupied the first seven chapters
of the book.

A significant change which Royce introduces in The World and the

Individual is indicated in the Howison letter.
on the voluntaristic aspects of knowledge.

He plans to place more emphasis

As a result, his theory of the

2811 But, meanwhile, our moral progress and our rational progress, mere minor

facts happening at a moment of time, are but insiwiificant elements in the infinite
life in which, as a whole, there is and can be no progress, but only an infinite
varlet~ of the forms of the good will and of the higher knowledge."
Ibid., p. 467.
2 Josiah Royce in a letter to George Holmes Howison (September 23;1°894) ,
Royce. ~ett!!_!!_, pp. 325-26.

15

Absolute will be more ohviously teleological. 30

And, a.-s noted above, this will

entail a more explicit statement of the teleological function of ideas.

It is

important to note that Royce still favors his argn'l!ent from error to the existence
of an Absolute.

The comparison of ideas and objects whi.ch comprised that argu-

rnent wi.11 still be a function of the Absolute in the following work.

30 "The Thought-category would be still emphasized; but I should also lay stress
on another element of reality, viz. the element that Fichte called Leben. The
'world of the powers' I should indeed respect no more than of old; but the interpretation of the Absolute would be more obviously teleological than, to many
readers, it seemE!d then." Ibi?_., p. 326.
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IV
Fourteen years separate Royce's first book from the two volumrs entitled The
World and the Indi.vidual.

Ori~inally

delivered as the Gifford Lectures, this work

marks the most systematic presentation of his philosophy of ahsol ute idealism.

It contains a repetition of themes already treated in his first work, but often
there is a new approach--indicating that Royce followed through with the plans
expressed in the Howison letter.

The influence of William James is said to be

behind many of the modifications in Royce's ethical posltions.

Conversations and

friendly arguments between James and Royce were often the catalyst for some new
insight in the latter.
one such example.

The new approach Royce takes toward future experience is

Another, though not entirely attributable to James• influence,

is the increased emphasis Royce places on purpose or will in his epistemology.
Similar emphasis is evident in the works of Spinoza and Leibniz, and more importantly in the works of Schopenhauer, with which Royce was familiar.
A noticeable addition to Royce's epistemology is the characterizing of an
idea as purposeful.
for some activity.31

It is not only a Tepresentation but also a plan, a scheme

"

Actually, Royce gradually moves away from his former

representational theory of ideas, so that eventually an idea is defined solely
in terms of purpose.

But Royce does not find this to be anything inconsistent

with or even absent from his earlier work.

The Thought-category previously used

to define the Absolute is said to have included both will and experience though
these aspects were not so apparent as they are in the present work. 32

His

argument for the consistency of this definition of an idea is based on the
reference of an idea to the final unity of the Absolute.

As an idea formerly was

31 John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy_ (Bal ti.oore '. Penquin. 1968),
pp. 92-93.
32"In my fir:i;t book the conception of the Absolute was defined in such wise
as led me then to prefer, quite deliberately, the use of the term fhought as the
best name for the final unity of the Absolute. While this term was there so defined
as to make Thought inclusive of Will and of Experience, these latter terms were not
emphasized prominently enough. • • •" Royce, !!1e World and the Individual_, I, ix.
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described as a fragment of Universal Thought so now it is a fragment of Absolute
Purpose or Experience.

The latter category is defined as '"an experience which

finds fulfilled all that the completest thought can rationally conceive as
genuinely possihle.

11

•

33 The concept of fulfillment will :increasingly play an

important part in Royce's epistemology.

But

~gain,

the relation between a finite

idea and its ultimate completion has not been altered in the years since
~el.i~ious

change,

34

AsEect.

'.J'h~

Royce explicitly states that there has been no significant

and what foldows details the continuity of the meaning of an idea in

relation to its terminus.

An idea in The

Relig,~~~

Aspect of _!'hiloso£hr... was taken generally to be a

representation of a real object.
comparing, higher thought.

The tl'Uth of the idea was known only to the

It took an image or concept and related it to the

reality perceived or conceived.

In The World and the Individual_, Royce moves

beyond this representational theory.

He stresses the unity of conscious acts,

i.e. the reception of sense impressions is always accompanied by a selective
awareness of what to be interested in and how to act toward things known.
"There is no purdy intellectual life, just as there is no purely voluntary life."
And Royce adds, "your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere images
of the thinirs, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act
towards the things of which you have ideas. u35

What Royce opens up with this

theory of the idea as purposeful is the whole question of knowledge as contextual.
An idea is not merely an image hut a plan that requires a prior understanding of
how one is to deal wit'.h somethinp,.

Complexity is added to a representational

theory, for ideas do not emerge solely as responses to sense stimuli.
also n context of interests that constitute n forehaving of perception.
selectivity er purpose of an

ide~

Royce will call its internal meaning.

33Introduction by John Clendenning to Royce, Letters, p. 33. ·
Mnoyce, The World and the I~1divi~~1_, I, xiv.
35Jbid., p. 2~:

There is
The
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The inten1al meaninR :ls the conscious content of an idea that expresses
some purpose.

Put a.nothe-r way, it is th<:> idea as directed to scme spocific

end which it partially fulfills. J6

The concept of ful filliTh)t:.t is central to

this theory, for bot'h the success of an idea and its ultimate t?'uth will be
j udge<l in term..;; of accomplishing some rmTpcse.

As wil 1 be sec-n below, the ultimate

truti1 cf any sinile idea will not be the fulfillment of its conscious purpose.
As a tool for accomplishing some speci fie end, however, an idea will he termed
successful or true if it completes its purpose.

This latter aspect of an idea is

uore closely allied to the earlier representational theory.

A specifi.c purpose

is related to end boyond itself. i.e. it means or refers to a fsct that is other
than it.

Royce fiTst affi.ms the pri1:1acy of internal meaning over an i.dea's

exterNi.l reference and then proceeds to account for the absorption of this

expernal meaning into the internal meaning.

en an analysis of everyday experiences.

The primacy of the 1 atter is based

The presence of volition in counting

ohjects or singing tunes is evidence that thought as activity proceeds from a

context of interests and purposes.

nefore there is a reference to some object.,

there must be an interest in it and a desire to act toward it.

For Royce this

analysis reveals that the internal meaning of an idea is the necessary condition

I
I

I!

for all external meaning and truth. 37
These characterizations of human knowing are part of Royce's metaphysics
termed Voluntoristic Idealism.

The epistemology of this position entails a view

of reali.ty that is known as the embodiment of wil 1.

Presupposed is that an idea

seeks to find in its object nothing but its own purpose expressed in a way that
the idea at the moment does not possess.

In Royce's words, "When I have an idea

of the world, my idea is a will~ and the world _!>f !J!l idea~.:~ly

::r o~~_i}_~-

---· ·---.36 1 'Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present collscious embodiment
in the contents and in the form of the complex state cal led the idea, constitutes
what I shall hereafter call the Internal Meaning of the Idea. Or, to repeat, the
state or complex of states called the idea. presents to consciousness the expressed
although in general the inconrolete fulfilment of a purpose." Ibid., p. 25.
37
•
~bid_. J 311.

11
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~tsel f determinate tr embodie2. ,. 3s

This is not to say that objects, other minds,

space and time are the ideal products of will.

But this position does hold that

ideas of these objects are present to the knower only as his own conscious act.
In other words, his own interest in them and attentiveness to them is constructive

of their meaning.39

But if this is true, then the external reference of an idea

is not to something wholly other than it.

Royce arrives at this conclusion by

estimating the constructive aspect of purpose as determinate of all meaning.

He

thus modifies his earlier definition of an idea.
Our first definition of the idea seems to make, yes, in its abstract
statement deliberately tries to make, as you see, the external meaning
something sharply contrasted with the internal meaning. Our final
result will simply reabsorb the secondary aspect, the external meaning,
into the completed primary aspect,--the completely embodied internal
meaning of the idea.4Q
This is not to say that an idea no longer has an external reference.

Indeed its

ultimate truth depends on a meaning other than that consciously embodied in a
specific purpose.
achieve.

The idea refers to a wider purpose than any it can itself

Fulfillment is now spoken of not as the pragmatic activity of a "tool"

of thought but as the broader plan in which an idea shares.

Such a plan is the

universal meaning, the unity of all ideas in an Absolute Purpose.
As noted above, Royce intended to emphasize the teleological function of
ideas more than he had previously.

Meaning is the reference of an idea to a

purpose--this is basic to his voluntaristic position.

Already recounted is his

view' that taken separately, reference by an idea to an object is abstract.
Ignored is the primary reference of an idea to a purpose consciously embodied in
itself.

But there is also the wider purpose to which every internal meaning

38tbid., p. 327.
39.'Space, time, past, future, things, minds, laws,--all these constituents
of the world, our supposed passive spectator of [the] universe indeed recognizes
as objects other than the ideal products of his will; but his ideas of these objects
come to him precisely as constructive processes, present to his consciousness as his
own act, and understood by him so far as they are his own meaning." Ibid. , p. 326.
40~., P• 34.

-
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refers.

This end is the whole of Being as known and willed.

The thesis of his

idealism is that reality is not independent being (realism), nor being in its
immediacy to an intuiting mind (mysticism), nor being as that validated by the
judgment (Critical Rationalism).

The real and the true is that which an idea

takes as its end and wills to correspond to. 41 On the level of everyday activity,
where common-sense knowledge flourishes and metaphysical doctrines have not been
developed, the criterion of truth will be quite pragmatic.

An idea, like any

took, is as good as its usefulness in accomplishing some task.

It will have to

be judged by its purpose and its suitability for carrying out that aim. 42
The fulfillment of purpose is the standard of truth for both everyday thought
and metaphysical theory.

Royce is consistent with the epistemology of The Religious

Aspect in not accepting the judgment as a separate act of intelligence that verifies
the correspondence of an idea to its end.

Rather, he says that understanding what

thought seeks is a process of determining the validity of meaning.

In other words,

the ideas themselves are the only content of the thinking process.

Through

experience the external reference of an idea will be adjusted to fit, will become,
an internal meaning.
among my ideas, this

Being is what I will, and through combinations and changes
bein~

will eventually be what I intend in truth.

Put another

way, my purpose will be found in determinate being as both something corresponded
to and something internally possessed. 43 Instead of an

act of judgment to the

effect that the conditions for the fulfillment of a purpose are indeed satisfied,
41Ibid., p. 306.
4 2YGid., p. 308.
43TITJiit which is, is for thought, at once the fulfilment and the limit of the
thinking process. 'nle thinking process itself is a process whereby at once
meanings tend to become determinate, and external objects tend to become internal
meanings. Let my process of determining my own internal meaning simply proceed
to its own limit, and then I shall face Being. I shall not only imitate my
object as another, and correspond to it from without. I shall become one with
it, and so internally possess it. This is a very technical statement of our
present thesis, and of our form of Idealism, • • • " !!?.!2_., p. 38.
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the explicit account of validity is here one of gradually modifying my ideas in
their external reference to conform to an internal purpose.

As will be seen below,

this conclusion only escapes the difficulties of subjective idealism by an
appeal to a higher Purpose.

A similar appeal in 'f'!te Religious Aspect, you will

recall, extricated the thinker who recognized the fact of error from his own closed
world of ideas.

Brief note was made above of Royce's rejection of reality as defined by the
realist, the mystic, and the tradition generally labelled "critical rationalism."
His arguments against these positions cannot be reproduced here.

He offers in

place of them and indeed as their only rational and complete explanation a fourth
concept of Being.

Being is not independent of mind (realism), nor is it in a

state of immediacy to mind (mysticism), nor is it that which is grasped by a
specific act of mind, namely, the judgment (critical rationalism).
What is, or what is reel, is as such the co
t

finite tdeas'. ¥4

Rather--

lete embodiment, in
e nterna mean ng of

Recall that the absorption of an idea's external meaning by its internal meaning
is preliminary to this conception of Being.

One reason for this conflation was

Royce's handling of the problem of future events--a problem also treated in
The

Be~igious

Aspect.

In The World and the Individual,

t~e

third concept of

Being as the verified is shown to be inadequate for explaining the truth of a
future event.

That which is yet outstanding in experience, that which has not

yet occurred, is not nothing, for a person does act toward the future in very

concrete ways.

The concept of fulfillment is needed to replace that of validity.

The fourth concept of Being is noticeably teleological.

Being is other than

a single idea, not because it is independent of ideas. but because it completely
expresses what an idea only partially expresses.
44 Ibid., p. 339.

Here we are not speaking of
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an idea as a "tool" for a specific end.

Rather, an idea is seen as intending Being,

i.e. willing its inclusion in a purpose that expresses all aims fully and system. 11 y. 4S·
at1ca

Such a purpose, Royce coTttends,

hold~

ings of what otherwise appear as separate ideas.

in unity all the internal meanBut each idea, when not viewed

abstra.ctly, is sait; to imply this syscematic inclusion of meaning in one purpose. 46
If this systematic totalicy were known immediately in any single idea, i.e. if it
were a part of human experience. then the second concept of being, that of the
mystic, \.;ould be correct.

In Royce's words, the knower would then experience

"finality, i.e. full expression of what our finite ideas both mean and seek. 1147
nut this experience is not to be had by a finite individual.

Tiiere is a precon-

tainment of the uni versa! meaning in human ideas, but this is not known directly.
The teleological function of ideas is covered ()Ver hy attention to limited ends
and by ignorance of the totality actually sought.

1?.bels "finite vagueness of mca.ninr,."

This state of affairs Royce

For what is truly meant is the Absolute

ever: tl-iough this is not l~nown to consciousness. 48

The teleological function of

ideas, therefore, is l:nown by implication and not hy empirical analysis.
idea's ultimate reference is not conscious

meanin~

other words.

a11

individual.

This is consistent with the position taken in The

<?.i~~~1il_~~J?:'.:r_•

In

for the

!_elii;doE-.:~SP!E~

namely, the true object is known only to a higher consciousness.

Truth in both cases is not the possession of finite intelligence.
What proof is there that ideas express even incompletely such finality?

It

4 5Ibid., pp. 386-87.
46 11 To be means simply to express, to emhody the complete internal meaning
of a certain ahsolute system of ideas,--a system, moreover, which is genuinely
implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however
fragmentary." Ihid., p. 36.
47rhid., p-:--347.
48it"(5\ir theory, as you already see, will identify finite ignorance of Reality
with finite ~agueness of meanin~, will assert that the very Absolute, in all its
fulness of life, is even now the ohject that you really mean by your fragmentary
passing ideas, and that the defect of your present human form of momentary consciousr1ess lies in the fact that you just now do not know precisely what you mean."
!~id., p. 3n.
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certainly is nothing that would occur to ordinary everyday ti1ougnt.

For what this

finality is as complete meaning is knowledge of the Absolute or God. 49 The proof
has been sketched above in various points.
to be in terms of fulfillment.

First, the criterion of truth is said

Validation through experience proves to he an

insufficient explanation for the truth of future events, so the act of verification is ultimately found in the Absolute which satisfies all purposes in an
eternal present.

The individual idea is said to

have an external reference,

yet its "other" which it seeks is only meaningful as willed or selected for

consciousness.

In everyday experience, the object of a mind's attention can be

more fully determined than it originally was.

events for the finite thinker.
thought seeks.

Leaming and revision are real

But this object is not the complete end which

As a "proximate finite object" it can increasingly fulfill the

conditions for the truth of what a man knows and wills.

For example, the chemist

waiting for the results of an experiment and a stock-investor watching µrice
fluctuations are attentive to proximate ends.

But the final end of their purpose

is being, not as an independent other !I but as the complete expression of what is

sought.
The final form of any idea is threefold:

1) as the complete expression of

the finite idea's internal meaning, 2) as a total fulfillment of the purpose
partially embodied in the idea, 3) as an individual life which is interchangeable
with no other life. 50 This characterization of the real object of any finite idea
is obviously not the result of any empirical observation.

Such an object as

known is fully present to the knower. i.e. there is no abstraction involved in the
knowledge of it.

And, in addition, this object as known is unique and unable to

be interchanged with any other object.
49
50~~~~·· pp. 39-40.
- · · , pp. 340-41.

The constant revision that characterizes
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human expression is in that case not a possibility for such knowledge.

Having

all the conditions for its truth hei.ng fulfilled and in need of no revision,
this object is said to be the world of Being present as one whole embracing all
finite facts. 51
The metaphysical problem of the

On~

and Hany is ever present ln

~oyca's

work.• but the epistemolo$!ical interests of this thesis limit our consideration
of that problem.

At th:i.s point of his philosophical career, it is Absolute

Experience verifying all past. present, and future finite experiences that ls
the pole of unity over against a mere multiplicity of facts.

The proof for this

fourth concept of Being thus lies in its account of the truth of events not yet
experienced on a finite level.

Again, this is a position consistent with that:

taken in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.

Truth and error are ultimately

arrived at in terms of fulfilling a final absolute purpose, i.e. ideas are
verified as parts of Absolute Experience.
In the

n fth

section of this paper, the ahove characterization of the Absolute

will be compared to the ideal final interpretation of the Universal Community.

Prelimtnary to that compa.Tison> there is a need for more details of the Absolute
as <le fined in The World and the In di vi dual.

Royce writes of the udi vine 1i fe 11

as a "single consciousness" accomplishing its purpose through all the manifold
ideas and lives of finite individuals.

The partial views and aims of men are

not: "illusory," but by that Royce means they are not separate or lost to a
universal meaning.

In other words, they all are included in a rational system

of ideas that is divine knowledge.

A final absurdity, an act that would be

5111 It is an individual life, pT.esent as a whole, totum simul, ns the
scholastics would have said. This U fe is at once a system of facts, and the
fulfilment of whatever purpose any finite idea, in so far as it is true to its
own meaning. already fragmentarily embodies. TI1is life is the completed will,'
as well as the completed experience. corresponding to the will and experience
of any one finite idea. In it:s wholeness the world of Being is the world of
individually expressed meanings,--an individual life, consisting of the individual
embodiments of the wills -represented by all fin+te ideas." Ibid., p. 341.
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irrevocably senseless, is not possible in this universe.5 2

Only the vagueness

and ignorance of finite thoueht could suppose some part of the world wa::
irreconciliable to the whoh.

From th*' side of the Absolute, all th<'up,;hts and

acts are eternally known in their harmony.
view raises cannot he considered here.

The problems of temporal ity this

Suffice it to sny that Royce struggled

to prove the reality of time just as ha felt pressed to argue for the reality of
human acts.

His critics have not been unanimous on the success of his attempts.

Absolute consciousness is said to hold all time and all acts in one final
eternally present insight. 53

But this cannot mean that there is nothing finite

for the Ahsoluto, for that was precisely the disappointing outcome of the mystic's
view of reality.

The mystical experience of God as the All wherein finitude was

only illusion revealed a barren Absolute.
Royce emphasizes the reality of individual lives and experiences as a way to
counter the nothingness of the mysticrs Absolute. 54

Whether he actually makes a

case for the reality of finite beings is not of concern here.
description of the finite pole of reality

th~t

interests us.

Rather it is his
It later will be

compared to his description of the Universal Community of Interpretation to see

whether the two systems of

n~aning

are identical.

The world of human persons as known to the Absolute is defined as "an

52thid., pp. 426-27.
53''11·iis complete insight is indeed not mcrelf one, hut is observant of all
the real finite varieties, of experience, of-mean ng, and of life. Nor is the
external insight merely timeless; but it is possessed of an inclusive v:i.ew of the
whole of time, and--o-twhatever, when taken in its wholeness, this our time-process
means. This final v:i.ew. for which the realm of Being possesses the unity of a
single conscious whole. indeed ignores no fragment of finite consciousness;
but it s~e' all at once, as the realm of truth in its entirety." Ibid. , pp. 397398.
---·
11
54 0ne ls the Ahsolute, because in mere multiplicity there would bo no
finality-of insi~t. Ma{' is the Ahsolute;-becausc in the interrelationships of
contrasted expressions o a. sinele Will lies the only opportunity for tht" emhodiment of wholeness of ti fe, and for the possession of Self-consciousness by the
Absolute. For the mystic long ago showed us that simple Oneness meant Nothin~ess."
Royce, !!,l~ld and the Individual, II, 336.

r
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individual system of rationally linked and determinate; but for that very reason not
externally determined, ethically free individuals, who are nevertheless One in God. 1155
TI1e systematic and rational whol~ness of the human world is known only to the Absolute.

But the individuality and moral indeterminacy of finite
Absolute consciousness and human minds.
~iven

is known to both

For the former, individuality must be real

the outcome of the second concept of Being.

real in human experience.

bein~s

For the latter, individuality is

There is desire and effort, striving and imperfection,

in the world of finite beings.

In Royce's words:

As a fact, however, it is not only the goal, but the whole series of
stages on the way to this goal that is the Reality. It is the sum,
then, or some other function of the terms of the series, that has Being.
And, as a fact, Being must be attributed to both the principal members
of the relation of contrast, both to the seeking and to the attainment.
Else is the attainment the fulfilment of nothing. The finite then also
is, even if imperfect. Its imperfection is not the same as any mere
failure to be real in any degree. It is real in its own way, if the
Absolute is real. And unless the imperfect has Reality, the Absolute
has none.56
From the ahove one can legitimately conclude that finality, i.e. full
determination of the meaning of ideas, is a denial of mere multiplicity.

The

latter is to be understood as the possibility of ideas falling outside a system

of universal meaning.

But finality cannot deny multiplicity, for without the

contrast between full and partial meaning, the ultimate goal of thought is mystical
oblivion.

The finality of ideas, therefore, affirms both a single Will and count-

less purposes that express that Will.
~e~~·

The question now, as it was in The

Religiou~

is whether there is a radical discontinuity between the Absolute Will and

its infinitude of. conscious expressions.

In the fifth section to follow below

this same question will be put to the social interpretation of any community and
the final meaning attained in the Universal Community.
Noted above was that the ultimate end of any finite purpose need not be the

~~Royce, The World and the Individual. I, 42.
Ibid., pp. 193-94.
I'

I' I
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conscious meaning had by an individual as to what he was after.

There is thus

a non-identity between my specific end or object and the real end or object.

The

teleological function of an idea is not an experiential datum but a metaphysical
theory.

Common enough to experience is the effort expended to fit our ideas to

recalcitrant facts.
examples.

Experimentation or just plain guess-work are familiar

But Royce suggests that this ongoing struggle between thought and

being cannot be explained in terms of curiosity.

Instead he posits an Absolute

Thought that as the terminus of all finite intentionality provokes the continued
effort to interpret facts.

"Thought it i.s which goes on

~hen,

our present ideas

failing to light up sufficiently the chaos of immediacy, we look for other ideas,
in terms of which to interpret our problems • 1157 The language of this statement
is similar to phrases used in The Problem of Christianitl·

Royce comes close to

defining Thought as a project of interpreting the problems given in experience.
Indeed that is one aspect of the Absolute tha.t wil 1 he evident in the third
major work to be considered.

Then too we can ask what h

the source of the

effort to interpret facts, to seek new ideas more adequate to present problems.

Thought is what overcomes the "vagueness" of meaning apparent to the finite
knower and drives him on to recognize Bf'!ing as the final end of his own thought.
Yet, again in opposition to the mystic's intuition of Being, Royce asserts
that no finite consciousness can reach this and.

There is a radical discontinuity

between the Absol utt" consci.ousness and every human <".OnscifJti.~ness. 58
all of reality h

to bf! eternally one with it, i.e. to be God.

The

For to know
totality of

Being ls therefore only shaTed in by rational beings but never encompassed by
their thought.
This discontinuity would seem to make speech about the whole quite difficult.

As in the former work, Royce proceeds to draw analogies from human experience.
57 1bid., p. 58.
58fbfd., fn. 1, 192.

28

fie is insistent that the comparisons made fall far short of Absolute Consciousness.S 9

Yet one glimpses something of the divine oneness when one reflects

on the systematic wholeness of mathematical procedure or experiences the
exclusivity of some particular moral interest.

In a letter written several

years after !Jle WoTld and the Individual, Royce speaks of "'looking C.odwards"
as

a possibility for

Wlderstandin~

something of the Absolute.

He apparently

means that, if one Rdopts as his moral ideal whatever he takes to be the divine
purpose for him, he will be capable of experiencing, however imcompletely, the
unity of the

~ivine

life. 60

A final and more significant analogy is made by

Royce in regard to social relations.

It is not tmtil man views himself as a member of an tmiversal society,
whose temporal estrangements are merely incidental to their final
unity of meaning, that man rationally appreciates the actual sense of
the conscious ideas that express his longing for oneness with an
absolute life. We are relat~d to C.od through our consciousness of our
fellows. And our fellows, in the end, prove to be far more various
than the mere men. It is one office of philosophy to cultivate this
deeper sense of companionship with the world.61
In these three sentences is much of what Royce was to develop at great
length in The Problem of Christianity.

The bonds of a Wliversal commllllity are

stronger than all the factionalism and conflict among tempora.l societies.

Yet

these bonds are not more than ideal from a human perspective, just as "oneness
with an absolute life" is still outstanding to human experience.

The universal

community itself is to be viewed as more than an aggregate of men--a view to be
repeated in Royce's next major work.

Finally. acceptance of one's inclusion in

such an ideal community is an act concomitant with the acknowledgement that
one's ideas mean more than they appear to mean.

In other words, the true

internal meaning of one's ideas is revealed in the desire to be reconciled with
one's fellow men.

Universa.lity of meaning. therefore, can be approxi.mated in

·-----------s9Ibid., PP· 418-19.
60Josfah Royce in a letter to Agnes Boyle O'Reilly Hocking (December 2, 1909),
Royce! Letters, po. 536-37.
6 Royce, The World and the Individual, I, 418.
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the imagination by a moral conmtltment to a world-comrnuni ty.

"It is one office

of philosophy to cultivate chis deeper sense of companionship with the world."
The following work is Royce's finest

expres~•ion

of that p:trticular office.
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v
The Problem of Christianitr continues to treat the question of the One and
Many, particularly the ethical proble!llS that Royce's earlier works had first
encountered.

There is a continuity in the absolutistic solution offered to a

world of disparate facts.

The Absolute, or final interpretation of the world;

is still a synoptic view of all reality.

But there is an added stress now on

the r,fii:ii~e expression of purpose. , Royc;:e is direre~ty concerned, with ~ theological
C\ '-t_ J..:.& l!A.rn""~ Ni<1f~,ik YC\lk1<t. ~~. QJ.-\f.. ~\Vii llM'\ \"''\W~c'
il-,,;L .l. ""'- r.-v,~ Q ~
1
1
modelAinvolves i personal relationship between
• as a member of a community,
and God as the Spirit of that community.

62

The individual is literally said to

be a community, for his life is a coherent interpretation of past, present, and
future.

And the Pauline Community is literally said to be a person, for the

Spirit fulfills, unites all the members in one individual life.

The relation-

ship of the loyal member to the Community is thus both individual and social.
But if the Christian's purpose, or goal, is to be reached, the other term of
the relationship, namely God, must intervene.
forms part of Royce's study.

A theology of grace and salvation

In respect to his theological model, this mention

of grace presumes a radical discontinuity between man and God.
be seen whether such a distance lies between the

communi~ies

It remains to

of the world and

the ideal final Community.
First, however, Royce does modify his epistemology in this work.

Many of

the problems which occupied chapters in his former books recur in The Problem
~f

Christianit.r_•

Knowledge of the minds of other men, the existence of the real

world, the human self as a temporal being--theseAsubjeetive idealism led Royce
to posit a higher thought, a third party, which compares human ideas with
their real objects and thereby makes truth and error possible.
I\

this theory of knowledge.

He returns to

Interpretation involves a mediating idea, an inter-

preting thought, that compares a conscious image with some other known object,
62 cf., the Calkins letter, Royce, Letters, p. 646.
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This is not to say that Royce aban-

and registers their similarity and difference.
dons

subjective idealism as a pl'eliminary position. i.e. the first, second, and

third ideas are not the real.

The comparison is not to achieve an identity with

the real object of thought but is to resolve the conflict between a fact of
immediacy (perception) and an idea (concept).

Left to themselves, the two remain

separate. 63
What is interpretation for Royce?

It is first a theory or doctrine of signs

which he learned from Charles Sanders Peirce.

Briefly put. the doctrine pro-

poses a third type of knowledge added to the perception of particulars and the
conceptualizing of universals.

It involves a triadic relationship between an

interpreter. a sign or symbol which is interpreted, and another thinking being
for whom the sign is interpreted.

Peirce held that an object of thought is dis-

tinct from an immediate object of perception or intuition by reason of its problematic nature, i.e. it is sign that to be understood must be compared with other
signs.

This process of comparison is considered by both Royce and Peirce to be

the ul ti.mate form of human knowledge, for it marks a synthesis of both sense
knowledge and conceptual knowledge. 64 The proof for this synthesis lies in the
solution it offers to the problems listed above.
Other minds cannot be known as perceived particulars nor as conceptualized
universals. 65
signs.

Rather they are known through the interpretation of behavioral

Royce's long-standing problem of temporality and human identity is like-

wise offered a solution by this third type of knowledge.

Self-identity rests

on one's separateness from the "inner lives of other selves" and on one's
interpretation. of his extended past and projected future. 66 The formerly
-------~---

63Royce, The Problem of Christianity, II, 183.
64oaniel Sommer Robinson, R~tce and Hocking: American Idealists (Boston:
Christopher Publishing House, 19-§), pp. 57-ss.
65Royce, 11le Problem of Christianity, II, 159.
66Ibid., p.

42.
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atomistic percepts that comprised memory are now capable of forming some coherent
whole other than a system of concepts.

Interpretative knowledge is thus a solution

to the problem noted in The Religious Aspect, namely, how a past idea can be
Finally, the problem of the existence of the

identified with one presently known.

real world receives an adequate response in terms of interpretation.

Since Royce's

idealism excludes the possibility of an act of judgment affirming the real, the
alternative to interpretative knowledge is a single concept or percept for all
reality.

Both these alternatives cannot resolve the conflicts among facts and

ideas; there is a need for a comparison of them.

Royce concludes that belief in the

existence of the real world is just such an experience of conflicts among our
thoughts.
to us.

It is a situation calling for an interpretation that is not yet known

And consequently what will be termed the "real world" is simply the true

intel'pretation of this problematic situation. 67
Much of the background to this new development in Royce's epistemology
must

remain unexplored here.

One

between the pragmatists and Royce.

controversy of interest, however, is the debate
An

idea for the former group is said to be a

tool for characterizing the data of perception or for predicting future perceptions.68
Royce charges that the pragmatists accept a dualism in cognitive processes such that
perception and conception are mutually opposed.

Two consequences of this view are

the theses that truth is mutable and that "the sole criterion of the present state
of the truth is to be found in the contents of particular pereeptions. 1169 But this
dualism is responsible for the impasse of the problems listed above.
explain how we know other minds or even ourselves.

It cannot

So Royce's suggestion of

a

third type of knowledge is both a response to these problems and a criticism of the
epistemology advocated by pragmatists.
Another argument for the genuine distinctness of interpretative knowledge is
67

·:
Ibid., pp.
263-64.

68I61'd., p. 181.

69fbid., pp. 153-54.
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based on the world of "common objects." Those shared items which everyday
thought takes for granted cannot be explained by reference to any single perception.

No one man ever experiences a common object as such; so the assertion

that there are such objects cannot be verified in terms of the individual's
perceptions.

Rather knowledge of common objects is erTived at by comparison,

i.e. judging that this idea of yours is similar to one of my own and both are
fittingly applied to the same item.

But the world of common objects is also

a social world--a world in which a community of interpretation possesses
connon meanings.

70

This discovery lalDlches Royce's discussion of the co111J1lunity

and the primacy of social meaning.
As

an instance of what he means by a social world. Royce refers to

scientific discoveries.

The individual scientist may verify to his own satis-

faction some results of an experiment, but his results cannot be properly
termed a scientific fact until, through further confirmation, they become
the accepted possession of a scientific community. 71

Again, common or public

objects presuppose a community which experiences them precisely as such.

Other-

wise, scientific facts would be in need of endless verification by every individualhkho ,so.ught to employ them.

But the limitations of private experience

are surpassed by cooperative enterprises of a community sharing a common purpose.
Indeed the vast majority of problems encountered in life will be interpreted
according to the meaning already had by an individual's social life.
of society over the individual is hasic in Royce's philosophy.

The primacy

He terms a fiction

any philosophy of man based on the theory of a fundamentally asocial individual.
Man begins in submission to society and only later asserts his independence. 72
The individual's self-awareness is thus formed within a complex social environment

70John E. Smith, Royce's Social Infinite (New York:
1950)., p.

s.

Liberal Arts Press.

lfuss, The Moral Philosophy, pp. 120-21.
72Jbi2_. * p. 99.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.
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and only later is strong enough to rebel against his native community.

So both

self-knowledge and the awareness of other minds, as well as knowledge of common
objects, presuppose a community of interpretation.
Royce offers a series of definitions of what be means by "community."
The most basic one requires that the members share a common past and accept as
part of their lives an anticipated future.

The former aspect is termed a

"community of meJDOry," the latter is either a "community of expectation" or a
"co111111unity of hope. u73 The emphasis of this definition is practical 1 i.e. deeds
already done or ends yet to be won.

The individual has his own unique personality

but at the same time shares in a life common to all the members.

sharing, two ends are achieved.

And by so

The community is a value for the individual and

through imitation and criticism leads him to self-realization.

Equally of value

to other persons, the community unites them through a common past and future and
thus introduces harmony into social relations. 74 Th~ two ends are not reached
if human relations are solely on the level of a collectivity.

Royce rejects

Bentham's utilitarianism because it purports to base moral activity on mere
aggregates of men, i.e. groups having no common memory and hope.75

Which leads

to the next definition of a community. The bond of a community is expressed in
social products such as language, art, and customs.

'nlese indicate that a true

community has a mind (Geist) over and above that of the individual or of the sum
total of individuals. 76

It, therefore, surTOunds the individual member with

pre-established meaning and instructs him in the ways of moral behavior.
But this guiding and restraining character of any community leads to individual rebellions.

Repeatedly conflicts break out between the individual's will

and the social will.

The origins are multiple but inevitable for any highly cultivatei

73Royce, The Problem of Christianitr, II, S0-51.
74smith, ftoyce 1s S"Ocial Infinite, pp. 9-10.

75tbid., p. 164.
76~·- p. 131.
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society which trains individuals in moral self-consciousness.

Royce is extremely

perceptive in regard to this conflict.
[To the extent that] society becomes more skU led in tie external forms
of culture, it trains its servants by a process that breeds spiritual
enemies. That is, it breeds men who, even when they keep the peace.
are inwardly enemies one of another; hecause every man, in a highly
cultiveted social world 1 is trained to moral self-consciousness by his
social conflicts. And these same men are inwardly enemies of the
collective social will itself, because in a highly cultivated social
order the social will is oppressively vast, and the individual is
trained to self-consciousness by a pTOcess which shows him the contrast
between his own will and this, which so far seems to him a vast impersonal social will. He may obey. That is conduct. But he wil 1 naturally
revolt inwardly; and that is his inevitable form of spiritual selfassertion, so long as he is trained to self-consciousness in this way,
and is still without the spiritual transformations that some higher form
of love for the community,--some form of loyalty, and that alone,--can
bring. 77

This higher former of unity with other men rounds out Royce's definition of
a community.
munity~J.s

The common memories and hopes, the spirit expressed in the com-

life, and the loyal commitment of the member to the whole are the aspects

of hfS complete definition.

of a cause. 78

He equates loyalty with a free and faithful adoption

By fidelity to such an end, the individual surpasses the temporary

estrangements of social life, or at least assumes a posture that is comparable to
"viewing the present in the light of the eternal. 0
be ascribed to ordinary social relations.

This moral stance is not to

Rather it is unique to communal living,

and the spirit of that living, made possible by freely bestowed loyalty, is what
Royce terms the "Will to Interpret." Some of the concrete expTessions of this
spirit were noted above.

These expressions are said to be more than the acts of

a single member or of the combined members of the community.
Geist, or better, they proceed from one wil 1 to meaning.

They belong to the

This will is analogous

tJRoyce, The Problen1 of Christianity, I 1 142-43.
78An extensive, though incomplete, reading of Royce's works indicates he
may have ignored the moral ambiguity of loyalty to an ultimate cause. Both the
fanatic and the utopian are capable of fidelity to some cause. Perhaps the work
of Paul Tillich on the topic of "ultimate concern" best analyzes the moral
uncertainity of allegiance to causes.
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to Pauline charity.

It is a will to reconcile men. 79 The genuine loyalty of a

man to his chosen cause is an expression of this will.

attitude that wills the unity of mankind.

He adol)ts a decisive

The question to be answered below is

whether this will to interpret is identical with an AbsC>lute Will.
To find an answer to this question, we will consideT a further description

Royce offers of one man's knowledge of other men.

Already dismissed were the

possibilities that this knowledge could be an intuition or a single concept or
percept.

The knowledge must be interpretative and communal.

100re than a polite inquiry into our neighbor's health.

It is something

The reconciliation of

which Royce speaks can be described as an understanding of what human relations
are from the viewpoint of an ideal observer.

Loyalty to a common cause implies

some hint as to what the ideal goal of that cause will
assume the stance of a man who had reached that

goal~

all men in their individuality and their oneness.

brin~.

If one could

then he would understand

But such a stance is not

reached by any individual, and so speech of it is by way of analogy.

Royce

affirms a similari):y between the ideal goal of the will to interpret and the
experience of comparing distinct ideas so that a clear insight into their meaning
is attained.RO

He does not develop this example \lllfortunately, but it is enough

for our present purpose to note that this use of analogy ia
insight has occurred in the two previous works.

respec~

to a final

The following quotation may

describe better the separation between hwnan experience an<l the ideal goal.
I am ideally aiming at an ideal event,--the spiritual unity of our community.

I can define that unity in perfectly empirical terms; because I have
compared pairs of ideas which were my own, and have discovered their
mediating third idea. nut I do not expect to perceive that unity asfll any
occurrence in my own individual life, or as any working of one of my own
personal ideas. In brief, I have to define the truth of my interpretation of you in terms of what the ideal observer of all of us would view
as the unity which he observed. This truth cannot be defined in merely
pragmatic terms.81

____ _____
.

79 Royce, The Problem of Christianiti, II, 218.
SO Ibid p. 252.
81 mer.,
•'
pp. 215-16.
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Note should be taken that the truth of my interpretation of another person

is again said to he kr.own only

to 1rn

''ideal observer."

Such an agreement between

idea and ohject wns known only to the Absolute in both previous works.

Ro)·ce

thus seems to retain the prel'liise of !'ubjectivc idealism even in this last work.

Ideas nrE: t:-ie sole content of the finite i.nterp.reti.nr rr.ind.

Reality as known

is reserved for an ideal insight into the whole "time-proceu."

And since that

synoptic vision does r:ot occur in any one moment Clf time, finality must be
described in terms of the category "as l f.."

of comparison
truth.

cor,;prisin~

This is not to say that the process

interpretative knowledge does not attain absolute

But it is intf!resting that Royce limits this absolute truth to two types:

the deductive certainty of pure mathematics and the moral certainty of an
interpretation that prompted a ~ood deed. 82

real is known to the finite intorprete-r.

In neither case is it said that the

Other Teferences to the truth arrived

at by co:nparison seem to be limited to exact definitions, and by that Royce may
mean analytic propositlons.

All the questions of knowledge and the teleological function of ideas can
be drawn together in analyzing Royce's notion of the Universal Community.

is his final specification of the meaning of

11

cot!lmml:i ty."

This

He defines it as a

"comm.-nity of interpretation whose li.fe comprises and unifies all the social

varieties and all the social communities which, for any reason. we know to be

renl in the empirical world.

"

He adds, "the history of the universe, the

whole order of time, is the history and che order and the expression of this
Universal ComT'lUnity • 1183 There is no ettempt to justify empirically this final
notion of the community.

The previous analyses of social meaning were based on

such experiences as those of common objects and other minds.
physical concept is to be compared to an act of faith. 84

:;Ibid., pp. 200-202.
tbid., pp. 272-73.
84 ThTd, p • 377 •
I

But this meta-

This is not so surprising
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given the earlier definition of any true community.

The act of loyalty .to a

cause, while a frequent enough experience, can hardly be justified if the goal
sought is still outstanding.

And since the model for this universal community

is the Pauline Church, the "groanings and travail" of the world's societies
forcefully remind one that the goal is an ideal one.
Again the lesson learned in The World and the Individual returns.

The

outcome of the mystic's concept of Being required that both finite striving and
the final reconciliation be real.

For the Pauline Co11111Unity this means that

there is one universal aim but a baffling assortment of interpretations of that
aim. 85 In Royce's less theological terminology, there is an endless order of
time contrasted with an ideal goal of final meaning for all that occurs in time.
''This pursuit of the goal, this bondage of the whole creation to the pursuit of
that which it never reaehes,--this naturally tragic estrangement of this world
from its goal ,--this constitutes the problem of the universe."86 And part of
that problem lies in understanding how an endless series of interpretations can
be termed the progressive realization of one spiritual meaning.

This question

was taken up in Royce's famus "Supplementary Essay" in The World and the
Individual.

It also is the basic problem to be treated by Royce's later concept

of the Will to Interpret.
The solution offered in the "Supplementary Essay" is logico-mathematical.
Briefly put, the Absolute is described as an infinite system expressing a single
purpose.

The Absolute is to be regarded as a self and hence is said to be a

determinate whole not only of thought but also of will and experience.

But if

this self is to be a whole, it cannot have a final experience, a last term to
its infinite series.
effort.

Otherwise the finality in question has no need of finite

The solution Royce adopts is borrowed from a German mathematician,

85Royce, The Problem of Christianity, I, 53-54.
86Royce, The Problem of Christianity, II, 375.
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Julius Dedekind.

His idea of the Kette, or infinite system. asserts that all

the members of an infinite series are determined all at once by the definition of
that series.

In other words, the series as a particular whole and each of its

members are determined by the specific order that the series by definition
follows.87 Each part of the series can represent the system as a whole.

Tilis

summary is perhaps all too vague, but what it indicates is that a part is defined
in terms of the whole while yet being representative of the entire series.

This

is consistent with what has been said of the teleological function of ideas.
That is, the internal meaning of an idea is only fulfilled in terms of the
Absolute while yet unconsciously intending that whole.
In The Problem of Christianity the process of interpretation is ideally
described as an infinite sequence of interpreting acts.

Tile goal of any one of

these acts is a complete understanding of the problematic situation being
interpreted.

A satisfactory solution may be reached in some situations by only

a single act of interpretation.
series of interpreting acts.

But there are some problems that demand a

And there are other problems of which a full

understanding must remain an ideal limit. i.e. a cooperative venture by many
interpreters only approximates this end by endless interpreting acts. 88 Tile
final interpretation, were it reached, would be absolute truth.

As noted above

Royce apparently restricts such an achievement in the temporal order to pure
mathematics, irrevocable moral decisions, and analytic propositions.

A final

interpretation of the world is thus said to lie beyond human cognition.
Is this to say that the final meaning of the world is not real, that it
remains only a goal not yet reached? This question must be viewed from both
poles of reality--the finite and the divine.

Already asserted was the vagueness

of meaning, the short-sighted aim of most ideas.
87smith, Royce's Social Infinite, pp. 32-33.
88Puss, Tite Moral Philosophy, p. 124.

But Royce has consistently
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affirmed an unconscious reference by an idea to the whole.
the whole thus functions through the part.

So from a finite perspective the

final meaning of the social world can be said to he a goal.
concept of the Kette.

The teleology of

Recall Dedekind's

The process of interpretation is said to be endless

(i.e. without a final interpretation), and yet every interpreting act within
that endless sequence is the expression of a single purposo, Royce's "Will to
Interpret." This will to interpret is the basis of the chain (Kette) or series

of interpretations.
that endless series.

It can only be fulfilled, completely expressed, through
So much for the finite perspective.

aspect of totality in Dedekind's theory.

There is also the

All the communal acts of interpretation

are said to be the expression of the one will to interpret.

The sequence of acts

must then be given in its entirety by this one purpose just as a sequence of
numbers is given by a formulation that defines an endless equation.

Since this

will is the expression of the life of the Universal Community (its Geist), all
the interpretations of the community are given completely at the instant the
comr.n.mity is initiated. 89 This is one argument for the reality of the final
interpretation.

It is based on Royce's adaptation of a mathematical theory in

his "Supplementary Essay." What remains to be seen is whether Royce asserts the
reality of a final interpretation in The PTOblem of

Christia~itr.

Already established is the teleological function of the will to interpret
expressed through an endless series of interpreting acts.
this will in its wholeness?

What can be said of

Royce describes it as a "spiritual process which,

in its wholeness, interprets at once the endless whole of time."90

He asserts

that, since the existence of the real world was earlier shown to depend on
interpretation, the world must have an interpreter.

Not just countless inter-

preters comparing, more or less successfully, their ideas, but one interpreter,
89 smith

Royce's Social Infinite, pp. 86-89.
90Royce: The Problem of Chi'lstianity, II, 420.
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who knows the real, must exist. 91

11lis interpreter is part of the Universal

Community, its spirit.
The World is the Community. The world contains its own interpreter.
Its processes are infinite in their temporal varieties. But their
interpreter, the spirit of this universal community,--never
absorbing varieties or permitting them to blend,--compares and,
through a real life, interprets them all. 92

A final, complete interpretation is thus real from the side of the divine
interpreter.

Equally real are the interpreting acts which are brought together

and compared by this interpreter.

The whole of reality is, therefore, a

\Dliversal community of finite interpreters whose spiritual unity is the life of
one interpreter.

This whole Royce's explicitly calls the Absolute. 9 3 However,

does this use of the word mean what it meant in his earlier works?
as

was already indicated, thinks not.

He

Peter Puss,

argues that the Absolute refers to

the generalized concept of the community embracing all the multiple types of
social groupings.

What follows below argues to the contrary.

Royce does say what Puss understands to be the meaning of the Absolute.

But this is not the whole of what he says.

The social world is comprised of

multiple interpreting societies which, in an ideal way, share one goal, namely,
the spiritual \Dlity of mankind.

Por Fuss this yet to be reached goal places

a moral obligation on each individua1.

94

The unity of the world, the universal

community, is thus something of a moral postulate.

But Royce explicitly asserts

that this \Dlity is present to an "experience which itself includes a synoptic
survey of the whole of time." The multiplicity and complexity of the entire

social world constitutes one "Sign" which is interpreted. 95 So Fuss is correct
to the extent that he says the Absolute is the social world, i.e. is a sign to
91 I bid ., pp. 269-70.
92lli'Id., p. 324.

93Jbid., p. 296.
94Puss, The Moral Philos~~1" p. 248.
95Royce, Th"e" ProbieiiiOTClirtstianit;r.. II, 286.
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be interpreted.

But h<t is incorrect in taking this to be an exhaustive .

definition of the Absolute.

The "divine 1i fe" includes both a Wliversal

community and that community's interpreter.

From a finite perspective, the

synoptic vision of this interpreter will always remain in the future.

It is

the still outstanding reconciliation of the individual with the commWlity
96
accomplished by the divine interpreter.
In the real order of time, this final
Wlity is experienced as a moral ideal.

If this were not the case, the mystic's

concept of the Absolute would be true.

Instead, there is a real working out

of the conflicts of our ideas and the problems of human relations.

But the

resolution of these conflicts and the solution of these problems is also real.
The world is the process of the spirit. An endless time-sequence
of events is controlled, according to this account, by motives which,
endless in their whole course, interpret the past to the future.
These motives express themselves in an evolution wherein to every
problem corresponds, in the course of the endless ages, its solution,
to every antithesis its resolution, to every estrangement its
reconciliation, to every tragedy the atoning triumph which interprets
its evu.97
This reconciliation at the end of a long process marks the defeat of all
evil and the banishment of absurdity from the world.

There is to be no surd

left uninterpreted, no meaningless act outside the single spiritual meaning of
the world.

Serious problems attend this part of Royce's metaphysics, but

our present interest is not to resolve them but to present his conclusions as
he gives them.

The question is still whether the Absolute of The Problem of

Christ!.!,n_it}". is identical to the Absolute of the two previous works.
certainly continues to stress
mystical experience.

Royce

the importance of avoiding the Absolute of a

The tragedies and triumphs of the temporal world must be

real events known to the Absolute.

In that case, the divine consciousness is

96 "And, if, in ideal, we aim to conceive the divine nature, how better can
we conceive it than in the form of the Comnnmity of Interpretation, and above
all in the form of the Interpreter, who interprets all to all, and each individual
to th~ world, and the world of spirits to each individual. 11 Ibid., p. 219.
7 Ibid., pp. 373-74.
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not timeless, or at least Royce argues that it is not (his critics have not
been Wlanimous on the success of his arguments).

But that there is such a divine

consciousness, an absolute interpreter for the world, is asserted in The Problem
of Chris.t.ianity.98

Therefore, the Absolute is not to be exclusively identified

with the Universal Community.

Thi5 is where the present thesis most directly

contradicts Fuss' interpretation of Royce's metaphysics.
Puss agrees that the goal of thought in Royce's earlier and later periods
is the same, namely, a "conspectus," a higher viewpoint that unites all meaning

in one ideal system.

He agrees that Royce consistently denied the attainment of

this conspectus by any individual at any one moment.

Where Royce departs from

his earlier works, according to Fuss, is in hi.s substitution of the Comnnmity
of Interpretation for the earlier Absolute Consciousness.

This Community is

said to consist solely of the activiti.es and interrelations of finite individuals.99
The final goal of that Community is, therefore, yet to be won.

The response of

this thesis has been lengthy and preliminary to the followin'- conclusion.

9811

we do not declare, in our metaphysical doctrine, that the divine consciousness is timeless. We declare that the whole order of time. the process of the
spirit, is interpreted, and so interpreted that, when viewed in the light of its
goal• the whole world is reconciled to its own purposes." Ibid., p. 378.
99Puss> The Moral Philosophy, pp. 106-107.

--
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VI
The question. which we are now in a position to answer, is whether there is

an Absolute Consciousness radically discontinuous with finite minds.

Put another

way, we can ask if the reconciliation sought by all interpretation is given only
as a moral ideal or is .lt in fact the fulfilled purpose of an Absolute Will •
~

Hopefully the previou.ilJ analysis of '.fhe P!'t'>h!em of

~hristianit>:,

latter question should not be phrased disjunctively.

Prom a finite perspective,

the universal community is still hidden and will remain so.
moral directive for all loyal men is, "'Si.nee you cannot
heloved community ,--~t.!!_ it. inlOO

has shown that the

Consequently, the

~the

universal and

But in terms of the divine 1i fe, all the

moral conflicts and antithetical ideas of the social world are said to be
compared and resolved.

Just as error and tl'Uth in the two earlier works were

made possible by the judgment, the comparison, of the Absolute Knower, so too
the determination of ultimate meaning, i.e. the absence of any absurdity, rests
with a divine interpreter.
That such an interpreter is real , for Royce, hu been shown above.

The

synoptic vision of this interpreter is said to span thv whole temporal order
holding together in one insight all the deeds and purposes of the social world. 101
As present in finite beings, this vision of finality is the Will to Interpret.
Its ttieological function is identical to the true internal meaning of ideas which,
in The World and the Individual, was the purposeful striving after a single
complete meaning known only to the Absolute.

The Will to Interpret is identical

with what Royce earlier termed Thought driving finite minds beyond their specific
interests and aims to a final meaning for all reality.

_________

Since this complete meaning

ls known to the divine interpreter, and Royce repeatedly insists no finite
,

lOORoycet The Problem nf ChTintianity, I, 359.
101 Royce, -The

ProhI_c:.~n

• -.-·""T":"'"'· II, 286.
of C!1r1shanity,
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individual can attain it, the Absolute Consciousness must he radically other than
any finite consciousness.

Titis conclusion is consistent with the descriptions

of Absolute Thought or Will in the two earlier

worl~s.

In

~11

three works,

analogies are used to estimate this Absolute Insight in terms of the human
comparison of ideas.
Finally, if there are to be any reservations about identifying the

Absolute of The Problem of Christianity with the Absolute of Royce's earlier
period, they will consist in pointing out the added complexity of the Absolute
as both Community and as Individual.

There is both the Community embracing

all the varieties of temporal societies and the Interpreter of that Community.

In his earlier works, Royce rarely emphasized the social rootedness of knowledge.
But he repeatedly strove to surpass the mystic's concept of Being by emphasizing
the reality of finite effort and desire.
life is revealed as nothingness.

Without this finite pole, the divine

With the writing of The Problem of Christianity.

this pole is comprised of countless social activities.

The opposite pole of the

divine life takes the form of an interpreter who reconciles t11is mult.iplicity
to its own oneness.

This reoonciliation is the Universal Community, yet to

appear but already known in an insight

spannin~

the whole of time.

Royce's

metaphysics. therefore, continues to found the final meaning of history, the
ultimate truth of reality, on an Absolute.

His concept of a community of

interpretation is a new formulation of the finite world, but in no instance is
this new term exhaustive of the meaning of the Ah solute.
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